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This paper will analyse the operation of the British common law of riparian rights in the Riverina 
District of New South Wales (NSW), Australia between 1850 and 1870.
*  Theorists argue that the 
predisposition of people to fight over or cooperate to exploit valuable resources depends on how 
well property rights are defined and enforced.
†  The operation of the riparian doctrine in the 
Riverina provides an empirical, historical example of why inefficient property rights promote 
violence.  Violence in this instance was based on collective action directed at the destruction of 
water supply infrastructure, specifically dams, constructed on various rivers within the Riverina.  
This paper considers why collective action in violence did not spill over into infrastructure 
construction.  It is argued that the failure of collective action was due to its high costs stemming 
from several factors: failure to meet optimal group size; problems of free riders; hold-up concerns; 




                                                  
* The Riverina District is also referred to as the Murrumbidgee District.  Primarily it includes the area between the Murray 
and Murrumbidgee Rivers including part of the length of the Lachlan River.  Refer to Appendix one for a map of the Shire 
Councils included in the district. 
 
† Anderson, T. L. and Hill, P. J., (2004), The not so Wild, Wild, West, pp. 14 
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DAMS AND DISPUTES: WATER INSTITUTIONS IN COLONIAL NEW SOUTH WALES, 
AUSTRALIA, 1850-1870 
I   INTRODUCTION 
There is much literature that considers the process of creation, evolution, and impact of property 
rights on resource exploitation throughout history.
1  Within this literature, numerous empirical 
examples consider the conditions under which collective action can be used to create or adapt 
property rights to increase institutional efficiency and prevent overuse.  Cooperation is more likely 
to occur when groups are small, homogenous, and geographically proximate because the costs of 
transacting will be lower than for larger, heterogenous, geographically dispersed groups.  This 
paper contributes to property rights literature by providing a detailed historical example of the 
circumstances under which violence rather than cooperation dominates users’ interactions.  In 
addition, while the doctrine provided the opportunity for non-violent enforcement via the legal 
system, the costs associated with a legal resolution to disputes was prohibitively costly.  As a 
result, the doctrine promoted instability in the exploitation of colonial water resources over this 
period. 
 
Much has been written about the early violence over water supplies in the Riverina during the 
period being examined.
2  However, these studies confine their discussion of these conflicts to 
merely a description of events that took place rather than an investigation of how the institutional 
framework promoted this outcome.  Violence that dominated during this period resulted in the 
wasteful use of limited resources, but also led to the stagnation of water supply development in a 
region that was subject to constant, crippling drought.  
 
The plan of this paper is as follows; section two will outline the theoretical literature relating to 
property rights and collective action.  Section three, details the nature of the riparian doctrine as it 
applied to the Riverina.  Section four, considers the uncertainties created by the riparian doctrine in 
relation to infrastructure construction and reasons for the predominance of violence over 
cooperation in water supply improvements during the period being examined.   
 
II   PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Property rights are dynamic, being both created and altered over time.  Creation stems from a lack 
of property rights to resources that become increasingly scarce as more actors compete over 
ownership.  As a result, in order to protect rents and limit over use actors create property rights to 
delineate ownership.  These activities then prevent the resource from becoming a manifestation of 
the tragedy of the commons.  The tragedy would result if the resource was owned by no one 
leading to competition being characterised by a race where users rush to harvest the good before   3
the next person.
3  History has shown that creation of property rights often takes place via collective 
action where a group of individuals acting in the absence or remoteness of the state attempt to 
maximise rents associated with clearly defined, defendable property rights.  Cooperation is 
prompted by increasing scarcity that leads to increasing marginal benefits of definition.  In turn, this 
provides an incentive for a group of individuals to define property rights allowing them to ensure 
efficient utilisation and exclude non-group members.   
 
Nevertheless, such definition does not come without costs.  These costs are determined by the 
characteristics of the user (negotiating) group.  In this way, when groups are smaller, homogenous, 
and geographically proximate costs associated with either defining or amending property rights will 
be lower than for large, heterogenous, geographically dispersed groups. Therefore, when group 
characteristics exhibit the former attributes history has indicated a stable form of property rights will 
be forthcoming.  However, these costs are also dependent on the size of the area to be protected 
in that, a larger geographical area will increase the optimal size of the collective required.
4  In turn, 
by increasing the size of the collective, the costs of organisation increase as members are more 
likely to free ride in larger groups because their lack of contribution is less easily monitored.   
Furthermore, as group size expands the proportion of rent for each member decreases thereby 
reducing the incentives for individuals to become a member of the cooperative.  Once a group has 
attained the optimal size required for the creation of property rights enforcement is typically 
determined by moral obligation or religious affiliation, more broadly, the social norms that prevail.  
Mutual monitoring reinforces the socially accepted behavioural norms of exploitation that exist 
reinforcing compliance.  Punishment may occur should individuals break the rules associated with 
resource use, but such punishment is typically nominal.
5 
 
Generally, when a stable set of property rights does evolve, the credible threat of violence remains 
the backdrop of contractual enforcement should any party choose to deviate from the agreed 
terms.
6  Umbeck illustrates the importance of a credible threat in his analysis of property rights on 
the Californian gold fields.
7  In this instance, it was the fact that every miner carried a gun thereby 
equalizing violence potential and providing the credible threat of violence that ensured a stable set 
of property rights to mining evolved.  As a result, all miners could then devote maximum resources 
to mining, maximising productive returns, and increasing over all societal wealth. 
 
Institutions that fail to define or enforce property rights efficiently encourage conflict and violence.  
Whether the credible threat of violence will evolve into fighting rather than negotiating to reorganise 
or enforce property rights will depend on whether participants expect this form of communication to 
convey essential information more cheaply than threats or negotiation.
8  For instance, in the act of 
enforcement of rights, negotiation will be costly if an actor is faced with a low probability of success   4
via this method.  Assume one method of negotiation to enforce rights is via the legal system that is; 
individuals can rely on a third party arbitrator (judge) to interpret rules to determine which person is 
acting outside their rights and apply an appropriate remedy.  The choice of this method of 
negotiation as compared with violence will be determined by the resource costs of each compared 
with the likelihood of winning that is, the benefits.  To calculate the likelihood of success 
information regarding the probability of winning under either method is required. 
 
In an information perfect world, where all future states are known, it would be assumed that these 
probabilities could be perfectly calculated by actors allowing them to determine actions based on 
transaction costs.  However, given in the real world actors are plagued by problems of information 
asymmetries and bounded rationality making these probability calculations more difficult, 
determining the success rate of either method will be a function of the information available to 
calculate success rates.  Specifically, if an actor has information that previous negotiations via the 
legal system have been more successful than violence, ceteris paribus, they would calculate their 
likelihood of wining to be higher under negotiation.  Nevertheless, if information regarding past 
legal decisions is either unavailable or lacks consistency, the predictability of negotiation leading to 
success decreases.  In turn, this would increase the costs of negotiation while limiting the potential 
benefit.  If, however, it is assumed that the actor has information to indicate that violent 
enforcement has led to high levels of success then they would favour violence over negotiation.  
Therefore, it can be argued that in the presence of inefficient institutions that lead to rights conflict, 
whether an individual will choose negotiation or violence to resolve the conflict will be a function of 
both the costs and the level of success, or benefits, that will be forthcoming.  For society as a 
whole, violence is the most costly of resolution methods as it leads to the dissipation of rents as 
individuals devote valuable resources to fighting rather than producing.  Regardless, before 
discussing the implications of theory on the predisposition to violence in the Riverina, an 
explanation of the intricacies of the riparian doctrines operation in NSW is required, this will be the 
subject of the next section. 
 
III   RIPARIAN RIGHTS 
The riparian doctrine dictated that only individuals owning land that came into contact with the 
water source acquired riparian rights.  These rights were usufructuary in nature where use and 
obligation was determined by the reasonableness doctrine.  Reasonableness was defined as “any 
use that does not work actual, material, and substantive damage to the common right which each 
proprietor has, as limited and qualified by the precisely equal right of every other proprietor”.
9  The 
reasonable use doctrine classified water usage into two categories: ordinary or extraordinary.   
Ordinary use allowed a riparian owner to use water to supply domestic and stock needs.  A riparian 
engaging in ordinary use under the doctrine had no restrictions imposed upon them.  In this way, if   5
a riparian used all the water in a stream or river for drinking water leaving nothing for those 
downstream the downstream riparian had no redress under the doctrine. 
 
However, if a riparian used the water for any other purposes, such as irrigation, this would be 
classed an extraordinary use under the doctrine.  It was in uses that were deemed extraordinary 
under the doctrine that a riparian had a corollary obligation not to diminish the quality or quantity of 
water flowing to lower riparians.
10  In this way, while riparians had the right to divert water from a 
stream or watercourse and to change the course of a stream within their property boundaries, 
these activities were not permitted to alter the quantity or quality of water flowing to downstream 
riparians.  Hence, riparian owners were permitted to use water flowing through or passed their land 
in such a way that was not incompatible with the equal or correlative rights of all other owners on 
the stream.
11  As a result, the riparian doctrine dictated users were equal in both right and 




Riparians were also entitled to lease or contract out their rights to non-riparians granting them 
access via the riparian property.  However, non-riparians did not acquire riparian rights, nor did 
they become part of the community of the river.  In this way, non-riparian contractors had no legal 
redress under the doctrine regardless of the impacts of upstream riparians activities.   
Nevertheless, should a non-riparian contravene the doctrine they could be subject to an action for 
damages by an injured riparian regardless of whether the riparian being injured had exercised their 
rights under the doctrine.
13 
 
Whether riparian rights actually existed in Australian colonies prior to Federation (1901) has been 
the subject of much debate in water rights literature.
14  One of the major complicating factors is that 
while it could be assumed that British common law was inherited in all Australian colonies by virtue 
of the Australian Courts Act (1828), that established the date for the introduction of British common 
law to NSW as July 25, 1828, after this date English decisions handed down had no binding effect, 
although they could be relied upon as decisions of a coordinate jurisdiction.
15  As a result, while 
this act established the riparian doctrine in Australian colonies, it meant that colonial courts could 
adopt, adapt, or remove the doctrine as they saw fit.
16  Therefore, whether an Australian court 
would apply the doctrine in its purest form and to its fullest extent was uncertain.  In this way, it 
could be assumed that until a case of riparian rights came before a court in each colony, whether 
or not individuals would be bound by this doctrine was uncertain.  Nevertheless, in NSW this 
uncertainty was overcome by court findings enforcing this common law relatively early in the 
colony’s history.   
   6
As early as 1853, in the case of Cooper v. Corporation of Sydney, where the plaintiff 
claimed an injunction to prevent the defendant from extending a trench that would remove water 
from a stream flowing through the plaintiff’s property the NSW Supreme Court determined that if 
the disputed stream could be proven to be continually or habitually following rather than causal and 
accidental, then the plaintiff was entitled to the flow of water without any unreasonable use by any 
other proprietor or occupier.
17  In this way, the NSW Supreme Court reinforced the common law 
perception that riparian owners were entitled to the flow of water without any unreasonable use by 
any other proprietor or occupier.   
 
Further cases supported the continued application of the riparian doctrine in NSW.  For example, in 
Lord v. Commissioners of the City of Sydney (1857), appealed from the NSW Supreme Court to 
London’s Privy Council it was found that subtraction of water from a stream that bordered Mary 
Lord’s property for municipal purposes was an infringement of her riparian rights.  While this case 
focused on whether Lord was entitled to compensation for dilution of river flow due to the extraction 
of water by the Crown, the findings were quite clear that the boundary of her property was the 
centre of the stream (ad medium filum aquae or ‘middle thread’).
18  As a result, the Privy Council 
found in favour of Lord allowing her compensation for the damage caused by municipal water 
extraction.  Hood v. the Corporation of Sydney (1860) also found riparian rights applied to an 
action for compensation by Hood for water extraction by Commissioners of the Sydney Water 
Corporation.  However, in this case, Hood’s activities had diminished the quality of stream water 
flowing to downstream owners of which the Corporation was one.  On balance therefore, the court 
found riparian rights favoured the Corporation asserting the requirement that as downstream 
owners the Corporation had the right to receive water without interference in quality or quantity.  As 
a result, Hood could not claim compensation for water extraction because his activities 
substantially impacted on the correlative rights of other riparians.
19 
 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, the most important riparian rights case heard by the 
NSW Supreme Court was that of Pring v. Marina (1866).  In this case, the defendant erected a 
dam across a water course that interrupted the flow to the plaintiff’s downstream property.  Here 
the defendant claimed he was entitled to reasonable use of the water, and the obstruction, being 
only minor and temporary, permitted him to avail himself of this right.  However, the court found 
that the right to an undiminished quantity of water was the right of every riparian and, as a result, 
judgement was in favour of the plaintiff because the defendant’s action was inconsistent with the 
common law rights of other riparian owners.
20  From the evidence above, it is clear that NSW 
common law codified the riparian doctrine clearly within the colony over the period being examined 
here.  In light of this, the discussion now turns to an examination of the nature and extent of conflict 
over dam construction in the Riverina.   7
IV   RIPARIAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT 
In the Riverina, riparian rights led to conflict and violence because, in an arid country, they failed to 
define and enforce property rights efficiently.  This is evidenced in the fact that periodic bouts of 
violence occurred predominately in drought years when water became a commodity.
21  While it is 
clear the riparian doctrine was ill suited to Australian conditions, commentators have argued the 
doctrine brought stability and tranquillity to volatile frontier communities, such as the Riverina, 
arguing the social system, notorious for uncompliant behaviour, exhibited extraordinary compliance 
with riparian laws.
22  However, the extent of violence as documented by more recent analysts and 
the local newspaper of the time (the Pastoral Times) indicates this was not the case.   
 
Violence took the form of dam cutting where settlers would dismantle the banks of dams effectively 
destroying their storage ability.  And, while there is no evidence to suggest any deaths occurred 
during these violent acts, they did become more heated over time.  For instance, the Desailly 
brothers whose dams had been destroyed on a number of occasions erected a log house with 




Dam cutting as a reprisal for interference with water supply began in 1858.  Violence was first 
reported on November 17 of that year when a group of eight or nine squatters
24 and their farm 
hands proceeded to destroy every dam located along one Riverina river referred to as the 
Billabong Creek (refer to Appendix two for a map of its location).
25  In this instance there was no 
evidence of these squatters attempting to negotiate a resolution either between themselves and 
the offending party or via seeking legal redress.  In fact, one squatter who had two dams destroyed 
in the raid, William Brodribb, a magistrate, noted that until the group of squatters had arrived at his 
house explaining they were going to destroy all dams along the Billabong, including his, he had 
never faced objection to these water storages.
26  After this initial flurry of violence, squatters 
attempted to prevent further violence by organising a series of meetings on the ‘dam question’ in 
the following year.
27   
 
These meetings were aimed at negotiating an agreement to allow dam construction under locally 
established regulations.  Generally, the dams themselves were not the subject of dispute, in fact, it 
was agreed that they were indispensable to the region.  Hence, the regulations to be devised were 
an attempt to ensure that all squatters had equal right to construct dams at varying intervals and 
specific heights along the river.  And, while the regulations established in July, 1860 were claimed 
to be morally binding there was no evidence of enforcement requirements or penalty for acting 
outside of the rules.
28 In addition, while the regulations were an indication of collective action, the 
aim of the squatters in establishing these rules was merely to alert the legislature of the   8
ineffectiveness of the riparian doctrine, and encourage an enactment to formally over ride the 
common law.  In the years immediately following these initial confrontations, however, rainfall 
increased within the district leading to severe flooding that destroyed all the dams on the Billabong 
and other rivers within the region.  Regardless, it was not long before squatters again faced severe 
water shortages and a series of violent destruction began again in earnest.
29 
 































   9
Paralleling the violent destruction of dams’ squatters had, in some instance, engaged in 
cooperative efforts to construct channels from streams and rivers to increase flow to tributaries and 
blocks without river frontage.  These canals were referred to as ‘cuttings’ where squatters would 
dig deep furrows for water to create flows from more permanent water supplies to creeks that 
generally lacked substantial flow even during average rainfall years.  For example, the Willandra 
cutting was begun in 1865 located on the north side of the Lachlan (refer to Appendix one) and 
included the deepening of the creek bed as well as a channel of approximately 17 kilometres.  Five 
squatters were responsible for this construction with the expenses being proportionately borne.
30  
Similar cuttings were undertaken on the Yanko and Willanthry Creeks.  While there is no account 
of how many squatters were involved in these projects evidence indicates that all expenses were 
shared proportionately.
31  In addition, there is no detail of how this water was to be shared amongst 
participating squatters.  However, given the general understanding of the application and operation 
of the riparian doctrine, it could be argued that water was distributed based on this common law 
premise.  Regardless, the most crucial point here is that there is clear evidence of collective action 
to improve water supply yet, these did not spill over into dam construction.  The reasons for this will 
be the subject of the following section. 
V   RIPARIAN RIGHTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 
In light of the details above, acts of violence were clearly the preferred method of riparian right 
enforcement by squatters during this period.  Stemming from this are two main issues to be 
considered.  First, why did squatters use violence to enforce their rights rather than use negotiation 
via the legal system?  Second, why did collective action in canal construction and violence not 
result in cooperation for dam construction? 
 
First, violence was the preferred method of dispute settlement because it was less costly than 
negotiation using the legal system and the success (benefits) of violence were well known being 
the topic of a number of newspaper articles.
32  Furthermore, violence was less costly than legal 
redress because of the inherent uncertainties associated with the riparian doctrine and limited 
information regarding the likelihood of winning in court that is, the benefits were not assured.   
Uncertainty in relation to success using legal means stemmed from two factors: the limited number 
of successful cases and the nature of the doctrine itself.  First, while there were a limited number of 
cases of squatters’ bringing legal action against those who infringed their riparian rights all of these 
were settled out of court.
33  In and of itself this indicated there was a lack of information as to 
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Second, this information asymmetry was compounded by the fact that the intricacies of the 
doctrine’s application meant it was difficult for squatters’ to calculate the probability of success with 
any certainty using the court system.  Specifically, the right of a riparian owner stemmed from the 
species of land rights granted and the nature of the river system being considered.  In relation to 
land rights, riparian rights were part and parcel of the land itself with their acquisition being 
restricted to land granted under freehold.  Squatters’ land claims, while sanctioned by the Crown 
under an annual licensing system did not give them legal ownership, it was simply right of 
occupation.  Whether right of occupation was sufficient for an individual to become a riparian 
proprietor is unclear.
34   Given squatters were not provided with freehold ownership or indeed 
ownership of any type then it could be claimed that they did not acquire riparian rights and 
therefore, a court would not have enforced an infringement of such rights amongst squatters’.  In 
addition, the riparian doctrine defined a river by continuous flow, however, in NSW, during times of 
drought, once flowing rivers often turn into a series of waterholes.  Therefore, identifying a definite 
water course became problematic as did the definition of the rights and obligations of ‘riparians’ 
when dams were built in dry watercourses that ran into other properties.
35     11
Despite these problems, most squatters believed they acquired riparian rights.  Evidence 
indicates that regardless of whether a court would enforce these rights, the principals of the 
riparian doctrine were known, accepted, and their implications understood.  For example, an article 
in the Pastoral Times stated: 
 
It may be primarily said that no one is justified in diverting water from a stream to the injury 
of any party having an inherent right to the use or advantage of the stream at a lower point 
of the river.  Here then at the outset arises a cause for innumerable actions.  A diverts a 
portion of the Lachlan; B, C, and D holding stations lower down, assert that they have been 
injured, and commence their actions in the Supreme Court.  It being principally a question 
of damages and not of law – for as we have shown, primarily the diversion is illegal…
36 
 
As a result, even without support of court judgements, squatters’ believed in principal that erection 
of dams themselves was not prevented under the doctrine but they accepted that owners were 
liable for actions at common law for any injury inflicted.
37   
 
Given these complexities of any legal defence of rights, squatters would have taken these factors 
into account in their decision making regarding their likelihood of victory in defending their rights via 
the legal system.  As a result, on balance, squatters’ would have recognised the lack of surety of 
success in the courts resulting in violence being relatively less costly than court negotiations.   
However, regardless of the costs associated with uncertainty of winning through the courts, 
evidence from squatters’ quite clearly indicates that using the court system as a dispute resolution 
mechanism was prohibitively costly.
38  In this way, because costs of a legal defence were high and 
victory via this method could not be assured, the benefits of this type of negotiation process were 
far lower than the costs.  As a result, violence dominated water rights conflicts over this period in 
the Riverina. 
 
Nevertheless, while violence may have been less costly than negotiation, this activity still had costs 
associated with it.  Importantly, it allocated resources away from productive activities to defence 
leading to a negative-sum-game.  In light of this, a second issue must be considered regarding the 
predisposition to violence over water rights conflicts in the Riverina, that is, given there was 
collective action in both violence and channel cutting, why did this not lead to collective action in 
dam construction?  Four main factors can explain the lack of cooperation here.  First, the optimal 
size of collective action was not achieved.  Specifically, because the optimal size of groups 
engaging in collective action increases as the size of the territory to be protected increases, 
squatter numbers were insufficient to ensure collective action could take place on the scale 
required for dam construction.  While disputes noted here occurred primarily on the Billabong   12
Creek and Lachlan River, these rivers covered considerable lengths of approximately 640 and 
1,370 kilometres respectively.  The number of squatters in the entirety of the Riverina at this time 
was approximately 373.
39  Therefore, it can be argued that squatters did not reach the optimal size 
required for collective action in dam construction.  A corollary point here is that collective action in 
canal cutting and violence required smaller numbers for effective cooperation because the area of 
exclusion was smaller.  For instance, the Willandra and Yanko cuttings were only 17 kilometres in 
length; therefore, the optimal size for collective action was reached relatively easily.  In addition, 
violence required fewer numbers for optimality to be reached.  Given it was also sporadic in nature, 
organisation of this type of collective action was less costly.  Overall, this evidence indicates that 
the optimal size for collective action in dam construction was prohibitively high therefore making it 
more costly than the predominant forms of cooperation. 
 
Second, collective action in dam construction was costly because the larger group requirements for 
effectiveness increased the likelihood of free riders.  Free riders in this context could be those who 
did not contribute the required resources for construction or administration of the organisation.  In 
larger groups the contribution of each member is less observable than for smaller groups therefore, 
in the larger groups required for dam construction, the inability of squatters to protect themselves 
from free riders resulted in the lack of collective action in these endeavours.  Third, because 
cooperative dam construction required higher participation numbers there was an increasing 
probability of individuals engaging in hold-up in the form of a legal challenge.  Assuming 
occupation was sufficient for the acquisition of riparian rights, Pring v. Marina (1866) indicates that 
a court would have found in favour of the complainant with the legal remedy being either an 
injunction or damages.  As a result, hold-up was a very real threat to cooperative efforts and could 
have resulted in considerable compensation being required.   
 
Finally, any incentive that may have existed or evolved over time for collective action in dam 
construction in the early 1860s was quickly eroded by the introduction of a new land settlement 
policy referred to as selection that is, free selection before survey.  Selection was introduced in 
NSW in 1861 and constituted a specific land settlement policy aimed at emulating the population 
density and social structure of the English country side, often referred to as the sturdy yeomanry.
40  
Two main legislative enactments introduced selection into NSW.  The first, the Crown Lands 
Alienation Act (25 Vic., No. 1), allowed individuals to select between 10 and 320 acres of any 
Crown land at a fixed price of £1 per acre of which a deposit of 25 per cent was required and full 
payment within three years, providing the individual resided on the land for three years and had 
completed improvements to the value of £1 per acre.
41  The second, the Crown Lands Occupation 
Act (25 Vic., No. 2) allowed squatters’ to secure leasehold land via an auction system with a flat 
rate rental being paid.  Once leasehold was acquired, squatters’ then retained the pre-emptive right   13
to purchase this land under freehold once the lease had expired.  After squatters’ bought the 
property and were granted freehold, they then had the right to lease adjoining land three times the 
size of the freehold property at a rental of £2 per square mile, per annum.
42   
 
The contention created by the 1861 acts was that they allowed selectors to choose land originally 
claimed by squatters under the leasehold system of licences introduced in the late 1820s.  As a 
result, squatters’ in the Riverina faced possible encroachment of their land by selectors without 
compensation.  This had one major impact on the squatters’ incentives to engage in collective dam 
construction.  Specifically, it increased the uncertainty associated with land occupation creating a 
substantial disincentive for any further improvements to water supplies on either an individual or 
collective level.  In fact, rather than improve water supplies, squatters’ diverted their resources to 
the protection of land claims via dummying and peacocking.  Dummying was a method by which 
squatters’ would contract with agents to select parcels of land on their run, register these with the 
Department of Lands (often under false names), and then sell the land back to the squatter for a 
small fee.  This practice also involved the registration of land selected under family members’ 
names, including children.  Peacocking was a practice used primarily by dummy selectors where 




From the explanation above, it is clear that the riparian doctrine was an inefficient institutional 
arrangement in that it promoted conflict.  This conflict was manifested in violent attempts by 
squatters to enforce their riparian rights against encroachment.  In this instance, violence was the 
least costly method by which squatters could be relatively certain of success in their rights 
enforcement.  In this way squatters were increasing the benefits gained from acting violently 
compared with the costs and benefits of engaging in negotiation via the legal system.  The failure 
of squatters to engage in extensive infrastructure construction in the form of dams was the result of 
the costs of organising large-scale projects because they did not meet the optimal group size for 
collective action to be forthcoming.  Furthermore, they were also unable to effectively protect 
against free riders due to the larger group size and hold-up because there was a likelihood that this 
would take the form of legal redress which was an extremely costly process.  Finally, because of 
the introduction of free selection, any possibility for larger-scale collective action was removed.  As 
a result, the riparian doctrine was not only inefficient in that it promoted a negative-sum game as 
resources were allocated to violence rather than production but also in that it failed to provide the 
appropriate incentives for larger-scale collective action to take place.  Given squatters failed to 
adapt this doctrine or replace it, as occurred during a similar period in the western United States 
with the introduction of prior appropriation, further study on why a transition to a more efficient set 
of property rights did not occur is warranted.   14
VI   CONCLUSION 
Theoretical literature claims that property rights institutions that are inefficient in their definition or 
enforcement of rights will lead to conflict and promote violence.  This paper has provided an 
empirical example of this in the Riverina district of colonial NSW that supports this theoretical 
contention as well as indicating why, in this case, violence was the preferred method of rights 
enforcement.  In addition, it also provides some insight into the limitations of the doctrine that failed 
to promote collective action in water supply improvements that could have prevented any further 
waste of resources in the form of violence.  While squatters showed a high propensity for 
organising smaller groups to engage in limited improvements in water supply and to enforce their 
rights via violence, the riparian doctrine resulted in such high levels of uncertainty more extensive 
cooperation was avoided.  Counterfactually, had selection not been introduced, it could be argued 
that over the decades considered here squatter numbers in the Riverina may have increased 
thereby resulting in attainment of optimal group size for collective action to be effective.  In turn, 
this would have led to cooperation for the large-scale infrastructure projects to secure water 
supplies being realised.  However, the problems of large group cooperation such as guarding 
against potential free riders and threats of hold-up would have to be overcome, adding to the cost 
of this organisation.  Nonetheless, due to the alteration in land settlement by the colonial 
government to increase settlement in the more remote parts of the colony, any possibility of larger-
scale collective action was foregone as squatters diverted scarce resources to protect their land 
holdings against selection.  For all these reasons the riparian rights doctrine was inefficient.  Why 
this high level of inefficiency did not lead to either an evolution of water rights by squatters 
themselves or an adaptation of the riparian doctrine by the NSW courts will be the subject of 
further research. 
   15
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